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Sources of Inconsistency in Societal Responses
to Health Risks
By W. KiP VIscusI*
thirdpossibilityis to reconcilethis seemingly
Society respondsin extremeand often inconsistent ways to health risks. In many inconsistentbehaviorwith a consistenttheoinstances, the pattern observed is one of
reticalframework.In this paper,I follow the
overreaction. The Tylenol tamperingincithirdapproachin whichI discussnew results
dents of the early 1980s drasticallyreduced that indicatehow the characterof individual
the national sales of this product, even
risk perceptions can generate inconsistent
though the seven reporteddeathswere all in
patternsof response.
the Chicagoarea. Isolatedterroristincidents
periodicallychoke off the consumerdemand
I. The Patternof RiskPerceptions
for Europeantravel,and the Food and Drug
Administrationbanned the sale of tens of
The genesis of my approach stems from
millions of dollarsof Chileanfruit based on
the relationship between perceived and acevidence of low levels of cyanide injected tual risks. Figure 1 sketches the relationship
into two grapes. More generally, there is
that has been borne out in studies of risk
evidence that individuals respond in an
perception. At probabilitylevels below Fo,
alarmist manner to increases in the risks individuals tend to overestimatethe risk
they face, even though these increasesmay level, whereasfor largerisksabove Fo, there
be rathersmall.
is a tendency toward underestimation. IndiAlthough one might be temptedto gener- viduals consequently exaggerate the risks
alize from such eventsto concludethat there posed by rare events, such as the chance of
is alwaysuniversaloverreactionto risk,other being hit by lightning,and underassessthe
patterns of behavior reflect errors of the
truly major risks, such as the chance of death
opposite type. Individualscontinueto fail to
by heart attack or stroke. In addition, the
wear seatbelts as often as they should given discontinuity of preferences at the zero-risk
the health benefits and the costs involved level indicates that there will be a substantial
(see RichardArnouldand HenryGrabowski, jump in the perceived risk level once the risk
1981). Similarly, society has until recently rises from being zero to some nonzero level
devotedinsufficientattentionto the long-run of risk.
environmentalproblems that we face, inI have incorporated this basic pattern of
cluding acid rain and the greenhouseeffect. risk perception within a general theory of
Our inaction with respectto these risks can
decision making underuncertainty,which I
hardly be characterizedas a rational rehave termed "prospectivereferencetheory"
sponse or an overreactionto risk.
(see my 1989 paper). The principalmodification in standardchoice modelsis that one
There are three possible explanationsof
replacesthe individual'sactualprobabilityq
such diverse phenomena.First, one could
with some perceived probability rr(q). For
simply dismiss this behavior as being the
result of inconsistentand irrationalbehav- example, using a beta probability distribution, if q is the risk of an accident, then we
ior. Second, one could device ad hoc explacan write rr(q) = (ap + Sq)/(a + 8), where
nations of why individuals underreactin
p denotes the reference risk level, q denotes
some instances and overreactin others. A
the risk associated with the particular event,
a is the informational content associated
with p, and 8 is the informational content
associated with q.

*George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Duke
University, Durham, NC 27706.
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FIGURE~1. RELATIONBETWEENSTATEDAND
PERCEIVEDPROBABILITIES.

This formulation is consistent with a
Bayesian learning model in which the reference risk p corresponds to the decision
maker's prior probability assessment. In the
context of accidental death risks, this probability could, for example, be the average risk
being addressed in the survey. In the context
of laboratory experiments, the probability
associated with the lottery outcome could be
the probability that would prevail if the respondent did not take the experiment description as being fully informative, but instead placed some weight on a prior in which
all outcomes in a lottery were equally likely.
Application of this approach to the
anomalies that have been observed in the
literature produces quite powerful results.
One can reconcile a large and diverse array
of types of irrational behavior with the standard expected utility model upon making
this transformation. Moreover, what is most
stniking is that this formulation predicts such
behavior as opposed to being potentially
consistent with these anomalies. For example, the methodology predicts that the Allais
Paradox will prevail, that there will be a
certainty effect in which individuals value
risk reductions that achieve complete certainty more greatly than they should, and
many other prominent violations of the standard expected utility theory.
II. Implicationsfor Risk-TakingBehavior
Consider a binary lottery situation in
which an individual faces a probability q of
injury or death and a probability of 1- q
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of remaining healthy, where the perceived
probability is given by r(q). In the good
health state, utility is given by U(I), and in
the ill health state, utility is given by V(I L), where I is the income level and L is a
monetary loss (possibly 0) associated with ill
health. For any given level of income, the
individual is assumed to rather be healthy
than not and to be risk averse. I will also
assume that the marginal utility of income is
at least as great when healthy as when one is
not, which has been borne out empirically in
the case of job risks (see my paper with
William Evans, 1990).
Let Y be the compensation such as a price
cut for a risky product, or a wage premium
for a hazardous job that is necessary to
maintain the individual's expected utility
level at UO,or
(1)

UO=(1-

(q))U(I+Y)
+ -(q) V(I+ Y-L).

The first tradeoff that will be considered is
how the required compensation Y varies with
the extent of the loss. Total differentiation of
equation (1) yields the result that
dY
(2) -=

dL

__q__

X

___V

0.)V
(1-7T(q))U'+?'(q)V'

_

>

As the loss increases, the required compensation Y rises. The more important issue
is the extent to which dY/dL is altered by
the introduction of perceptional biases. For
situations in Figure 1 in which q is below Fo,
r(q) will exceed q, implying that dY/dL
will be increased by the biases in risk perception for small risks. Similarly, the required compensation will be decreased by
the perceptional biases for high risk levels.
The analogous result for the effect of
changes in the risk level q are somewhat
more complex, and it is more instructive to
consider them within the context of concrete
economic actions that will alter the risk level.
In particular, suppose that we have opportunities both for insurance and self-protection.
In the case of self-protection, one can take a
precautionary expenditure c that will influ-
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ence the risk component q, but the reference
risk component p will be unaffected so that
we have ?T(q(c)) = (ap + Sq(c))/(a + 8). In
addition, one can choose to purchase an
amount of insurance x for a unit price of s,
leading to the optimization problem
(3)

MaxZ=(1-7T)U(I-sx-c)
C, x

+ 7,V(I-

L - sx + x - c).

The condition for optimal insurance is
given by
(4)

U'= (,lq)

((I -s)1(1 - T)) P.

Consider the actuarially fair insurance
case, where s = q. For 7T(q)> q, the righthand side of equation (4) will be larger than
in the unbiased case, implying that a lower
marginal utility of income in state 2 is needed
to establish the optimal insurance amount. A
lower marginal utility of income is associated with a higher level of insurance, so that
for the risk levels below Fo in Figure 1, there
will be an incentive to overinsure as compared with the unbiased case. For the points
above Fo, there will be an incentive to underinsure.
Risk perception biases have a more complex effect on safety precautions. The requirement for optimal self-protection is that
(5)

- dq/dc
a

+

[(1- T(q)) U+ g(q) V ]

8

(U- V)

The value - dq/dc indicates the marginal
productivity of precautionary behavior in influencing the risk level.
The requirement on the marginal productivity of safety precautions as reflected in the
right-hand side of equation (5) is affected
in two ways by perceptional biases. The informational content term (a + 8)/S, that
exceeds 1.0, induces a lower level of precautions by requiring a higher marginal productivity - dq/dc. In situations of optimal insurance (U'= V'), the net effect will be to
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diminish the level of precautionsselected.
When there is not full insurance,the results
become more ambiguousbecause the effect
of the risk perceptionbiases on the level of
insuranceand the expectedmarginalutility
of income hinge on how muchmarginalutilities are alteredwhen one departsfrom the
optimal insuranceamount,and on whether
the size of any such effectoutweighsthe role
of the informationalweight term. If, however, the dominanteffectis that the biasesin
risk perceptionsraise the requiredmarginal
productivityof safetyexpenditures,as in the
optimal insurancecase, then risk perception
biases will always reduceprecautionaryexpenditures.
The natureof the differentinfluencescan
be summarizedusing Figure1. Overallattitudes toward risk and the desirabilityof
insurancewill be governedby the relationship betweenthe perceivedand actualprobabilities.For q < Fo, risksare overestimated,
and there will be a tendencyto overinsure
and to be overly cautious in discrete responses to risk. For large risks, q > Fo, the
reaction will be the opposite. From the
standpoint of continuous choices affecting
safety, however,whatis primarilyrelevantis
the slope of CD, not the level of the probability, although this continues to enter
the expectedmarginalutility. Since the perception function r(q) flattens out the relationship between perceived and actual
probabilities,the marginalefficacyof safety
expendituresis reduced.A precautionthat
reducesa risk from Bo to Ao in Figure1 has
a more modest effect of reducingthe perceived risk from B1 to Al. The risk perception function consequentlymutes the perceived impact that safety precautionswill
have for all levels of risk.
These differentcompetingeffectsindicate
why one might have quite conflictingreactions to the same level of risk. Why, for
example, do we respond in often alarmist
ways to the various low probabilityhealth
risks that are called to our attention,yet we
fail to take appropriatesafety precautions,
such as seatbeltuse, that are availableto us?
Although a varietyof explanationsare possible, the characterof the risk perception
biases, alone is sufficientto explain these
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seemingly contradictory phenomena. The level of the risk may be overestimated, but
the risk perception function may also serve
to dampen the perceived efficacy of safety
precautions, so that when we have available
actions offering incremental reductions in
risk, we underrespond.
Although this conclusion is true for
marginal changes in riskiness, if there are
available strategies that will completely eliminate the risk, then there will be no such
dampening in the response. In particular, if
we can reduce the risk to zero, we not only
obtain a value of the marginal perceived risk
reduction probability along CD, but we also
achieve the additional bonus in terms of the
perceived risk reduction of OC. Thus, there
will be a predilection for policies that achieve
the complete certainty of risk reduction. This
predilection is borne out in studies of consumer evaluation of product safety, as consumers are willing to pay much more for the
final incremental reduction in risk to zero
than they are for the earlier risk reductions
of equal magnitude, even though economic
theory would predict the opposite. Stringent
government regulations, such as the Delaney
Clause's requirement that no nonzero carcinogenic food additives be permitted, is
likewise consistent with this orientation.
The character of the bias is dependent on
the nature of the risky decision. Individuals
tend to overreact to identified increases in
the risk level from its accustomed amount.
The study of consumer valuation of product
safety by myself with Wesley Magat, and
Joel Huber (1987), found that individuals
were willing to pay moderate amounts for
product risk reductions of 15 injuries per
10,000 bottles of insecticide or toilet bowl
cleaner used per year, but when faced with a
product risk increase of 1/10,000 most consumers were unwilling to buy the product at
all, and those that were demanded a considerable price discount. In this context, the
risky choice focused on changes in the risk
from the current risk referencepoint to which
consumers had become accustomed. In the
case in which consumers are focusing on the
risk increase of a product, the jump in the
perceived probability indicated by the segment OC in Figure 1 is the pertinent per-
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ceived risk increase from a marginal shift in
the product risk. Even if there were a risk
decrease of similar magnitude to the risk
increase, there would be no reason to believe
that consumers would respond in symmetric
fashion, because the reference risk probability p that individuals have with respect to
the risks posed by product improvements as
opposed to deteriorations in product quality
may be quite different.
III. DiscountingDeferredEffects
The decision problems that individuals
face involving risk are compounded by the
task of appropriately discounting these outcomes. Although it has long been speculated
that individuals behave myopically, there is
no systematic evidence that this is the case.
Studies of worker valuations of death risks
(such as my paper with Michael Moore, 1989)
indicate that the implicit rates of interest
with which workers discount the years of life
at risk on the job are consistent with rational
behavior. Our point estimates of the implied
discount rates are in the vicinity of 11 percent, which is somewhat high, but the standard errors on these estimates are sufficient
to include other market reference points,
such as prevailing mortgage interest rates.
In many respects, examining revealed
preferences toward risks to their welfare at
different periods of time may represent a
best-case scenario. A more important issue
from the standpoint of policy is how we will
address effects that will not simply influence
our own well-being, but also that of our
children and future generations. The U.S.
Office of Management and Budget (1988)
has long specified a 10 percent rate of discount as the main reference point for such
calculations-an approach that will drastically reduce the attractiveness of policies
such as those that reduce cancer risks, or
have long-term implications for our ecological well-being.
Although there have been a variety of
battles over the appropriate discount rate,
insufficient attention has been paid to the
implications of the productivity assumptions
that underlie 'such discount rate estimates. In
particular, if the appropriate rate of discount
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is in fact 10 percent, then the rate of expected productivity growth in the economy
also must be quite substantial to justify such
a high rate. This growth will boost the income of future generations, which in turn
will raise the value that they attach to the
risk reduction benefits. Recent estimates by
myself and Evans (1990) indicate that the
elasticity of the implicit value of job injuries
with respect to income is 1.0, and if this
relationship generalizes to other health impacts, then it implies that an increase in
income will increase the risk reduction benefit values proportionally. Valuing health risks
through use of high discount rates should
not drastically affect the attractiveness of
policies with long-term implications, provided that the benefit values are adjusted
appropriately.
Perhaps the main shortcoming is that individuals are likely to place an inefficiently low
weight on benefits to future generations.
Moreover, our social institutions have thus
far proven to be very poor at long range
planning, as there is a predilection for responding to more imminent crises. Indeed, if
it had not been for the hot summer of 1988,
it is unlikely that addressing the greenhouse
effect would even be on our national agenda.
As in the case of risk perception biases,
the most disturbing aspect of these potential
market failures is that the government poli-
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cies intended to eliminatethe shortcomings
often appearto be drivenby the same set of
influences.
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